A game-theoretic interpretation of Marcel Maussrsquo; lsquo;The giftrsquo;

原文作者 Robert Rider

摘要：本文提出了一个关于马塞尔·莫斯《礼物》一书的博弈论解释。这一结果为互惠制度是一种社会稳定的交换机制的假说提供了支持。假设在不同史前部落或乐队中的首次交流，用霍布斯的话说，是“短、肮脏、粗野的。”在自愿交换的制度缺位的状态下，他们最初的外部互动的特点是掠夺、掠夺和战争。正是在这些看似互相矛盾的关系中，更多的合作机构在一定程度上发展起来。本文展示了礼物和互惠的一般性，如果收礼方没有归还礼物以促成互惠，可以通过制造多种冲突（如威胁）来促成更多的合作。有人认为，礼物返还的最初动机可能是为了进行合作。就莫斯的观察结果来说，只有经过这样的合作，才可以使交换礼物演变成社会规范。而这进一步表明，冲突可能是互惠的根源。

关键词：礼物； 博弈论； 互惠；冲突

简介

经济学家们越来越多地把研究的重点放在分析权力以及冲突与合作之间的相互作用上(巴特莱特，1989)。事实证明，冲突与合作的互动是非常复杂的，并且不是相互排斥的。最好把它们以它们最纯粹的形式来看待，就像是躺在两个连续体的两端一样。尽管如此，在这两端之间，合作和冲突是复杂的混合体。诸如产权和交换等社会制度，我们可以将其解释为合作与冲突的结合。即使似乎是纯粹自愿性质的机构，也可能受到冲突的支持或者起源于冲突。通过扩大我们的关注点，将冲突和权力包括在内，因而我们对各种社会现象的见解，有了重要而惊人的突破。

本研究提出了对马塞尔·莫斯关于《礼物》一书的博弈论解释。研究结果支持了互惠制度是一种稳定社会的交换机制的说法。我们建立起了一个假设——在不同史前部落或部落之间的第一次相互作用是有特征的。用霍布斯的话来说，这个特征是“短促、肮脏和野蛮的”。在没有自愿交换机构的情况下，比如互惠的情况下，他们最初的外部互动可能是以掠夺、掠夺和战争为特征的，但这些团体可以通过更为合作的方式进行互动。正是从这些冲突关系中选择或发展了更多的合作机构。这篇论文展示了如果礼物不被退回的话，该礼物如何能够通过可信的威胁回到冲突中，使更多的合作关系得以发展。送还礼物的最初动机可能是争取合作。

首先，我将描述一个简单的博弈，这个博弈模拟了霍布斯描述的自然状态。在博弈过程中，我们讨论了相互捕食平衡的条件。其次，通过推导触发策略平衡，从这个相互捕食的世界逃脱成为可能。研究表明，合作越容易持续，生产和防御能力越强，两名博弈的参与者的捕食技能越弱。最后，我们根据这些结果发展了对莫斯的工作的博弈论解释以及关于互惠的一般概念。特别值得一提的是，总给付以及该机构承担的社会义务系统，与启动和维持合作的触发战略密切相关。

对礼物的诠释

这一结果为马塞尔·莫斯的互惠交换机制研究提供了一个有趣的视角，当注意到诸如“...慷慨赠予的形式”这些字眼时，莫斯尤其感兴趣。这些“交流”，虽然看似是“自愿、无私和自发的”，但实际上是强制性的。就像莫斯所主张的，虽然给付和给付反馈披着一层自愿的伪装，但它们本质上具有严格的义务，如果没有履行这个所谓的“义务”，将会以私人战争或公开战争的形式进行制裁。他们把义务强加给接受者，不仅是为了接受礼物，而且也是为了回报。

礼赠的目的之一，或许也是礼赠最初的目的，可能是为了逃离相互捕食的状态。此外，正是由于返回那个国家的可信威胁，才有了强制合作的可能。这就是接受者有默示义务回报的原因。拒绝给予，或拒绝邀请，就像拒绝接受一样--相当于一个战争宣言。我们需要注意的是暴力和暴力威胁是如何与合作交织在一起的。二者不是相互排斥的，反之，暴力加强了合作。

马歇尔·萨林斯认为霍布斯和莫斯之间有着相似之处。在他看来，在这两位哲学家之间有着密切的联系：如果不完全是礼物，至少有一种类似的欣赏互惠作为原始的和平模式。不过，两者之间有着根本的区别。而对于霍布斯来说，个人需要创造一个利维坦，一个站在他们之上的机构。为了加强合作，莫斯以及本文在此提出的分析主张，可以建立自我执行机制，从而确保合作。

此外，需要注意的是，没有必要制定一项“互惠规范”来启动合作。古尔德纳(1960)指出，在霍布斯世界中，互惠的规范可能会引发个人之间的合作。然而，前提是规范作为支配关系的原则，已经广泛地被人们所接受。这就引出了一个问题，即规范本身是如何被发现并作为一项道德原则被采纳的。这里的分析表明，规范可能是在建立合作之后形成的。只有在个人经历了送礼的互惠性所可能带来的合作之后，互惠的规范才得以发展。

它表明，互惠的根源可能不是和平和良性的，而是以海盗行为和掠夺为特征的。第一批礼物应该来自权力关系；它们经过一段时间的相互捕食之后才会进化。促成合作和交流的礼物应该是以在这一较早的相互掠夺性时期确立的那些主张为基础的。这些掠夺性要求可能为互惠规范的第一次表现确定了最初的一套道德义务。这些礼物会反映出博弈的参与者的掠夺性技能。博弈的参与者的目的是建立合作关系，越是熟练的捕食者，就越能从对手那里得到更大的礼物。随着时间的推移，这些礼物可能已经制度化，成为一种互惠的交换形式，但也可能保留了这一早期掠夺时期的一些残余。

莫斯注意到，礼物是一种“完全的社会现象”。诸如“法律、经济、宗教、美学、形态”等等概念，社会往往会将它与“直接的交换”区别开来。我们在这里展示的博弈，将一个非常复杂的社会现象简化为一个单一的维度，这个维度主要是经济性质的；需要特别指出的是，它没有捕捉到毛利人所谓的“礼物精神”。事实上，莫斯认为，正是这种人与物的不可异化，才是送还礼物义务背后的动机。不过，这里的论点是，至少在最初，送礼的动机是避免再次陷入冲突。

第一批礼物的作用是解决冲突，并允许发展更多的合作关系。这个认知一旦确立，社会规范和习俗（毛斯所观察到的礼物的这些其他方面）可能已经发生变化，从而在一定程度上也加强了互惠的制度。礼物的社会化和仪式化可以作为博弈的收益的演变而被并入到博弈中，随着时间的推移，每个博弈的参与者偏离规范的净收益会减少，因此任何偏离合作的行为都是不太可能的。实践社会规范所带来的好处将增加与互惠战略相关的“精神利益”，反之，违反这一社会规范，将会增加捕食策略的“心理成本”。

根据这一解释，人们可以认为这里提出的博弈分析是比较基本的，也就是说，是在一个更原始的层次的分析。这个博弈抓住了礼物可能发挥的最初作用的本质，即和平解决冲突。进行礼物赠送这一行为是符合每个玩家的自身利益的，因为这样可以建立一种更好的社会平衡关系。随着时间的推移，我们不能否认，新的社会价值观、信仰和习俗可能会出现，并且将进一步加强与互惠制度相关的稳定性质，但这不应混淆我们对礼物最初目的的理解：激发和保持合作。

利用萨林斯的互惠模型，一个关于互惠进化的可信故事出现了。当两个专门从事不同的劳动分工的史前部落或部落彼此相遇时，他们最初可能建立了一种消极的互惠关系。根据格里尔森(1980)的说法，“陌生人”非常不受欢迎，被认为是“几乎没有人性的人”。这个陌生人被认为是没有权利的。抢劫陌生人不是偷窃，杀死部落的“敌人”也不是谋杀。如果不是战争，他们最初的关系将是掠夺和掠夺。虽然随着时间的推移，他们继续参与到这种关系中，但帕累托改善或许已经成为可能。一种更加合作的社会平衡将减少冲突产生的交易成本，从而使原先用于掠夺的资源，能够重新分配到更有生产力的用途上。这种关系会从一种主要是冲突的关系演变成一种更加合作的关系；它将会沿着合作-冲突的连续体继续前进。正可能是这份礼物促成了这一社会演变，它为捕食与合作提供了必要的联系。进一步制度化和仪式化的这种礼物赠与只会加强其合作-激发性质；但合作将继续受到恢复冲突的可信威胁的支持。

结论

纵观历史，交换和掠夺战争常常以复杂的方式纠缠在一起。正如萨林斯(1972)所引用的利维-施特劳斯的说法，这里是敌对关系和相互给付之间的一种联系，也是一种连续性。成功的交换促成和平，而战争是不成功交换的产物。我通过一个简单的博弈展示了：赠送礼物的形式，可能促使史前人民从基于冲突和掠夺的关系，转向更具合作性质的关系。礼物概念中固有的冲突的可信威胁，可以发起并维持这种合作。虽然莫斯认为，通过赠与所确立的一系列义务源于事物和人的不可分离性，以及礼物的精神，其最初的目的可能是为了逃离霍布斯世界的暴力和冲突。

参考文献（略）

外文文献出处：Robert Rider. A game-theoretic interpretation of Marcel Mauss lsquo;The giftrsquo;[J]. The Social Science Journal,1998,35(2).

附外文文献原文：

INTRODUCTION

Economists have been increasingly focusing their research efforts on an analysis of power, and the interplay between conflict and cooperation, (Bartlett, 1989).The interaction between conflict and cooperation has proven to be highly complex. They are not mutually exclusive. It is best to think of them in their purest forms as lying at opposite ends of a double continuum. Between these polar ends, though, there are complex mixtures of cooperation and conflict. Social institutions, such as property rights and exchange, can be interpreted as combinations of cooperation and conflict. Even institutions which appear to be of a purely voluntary nature may be supported by or have origins in conflict. By expanding our focus to be inclusive of conflict and power, we have gained important and surprising insights into a myriad of social phenomena.

This research note proposes a game theoretic interpretation of Marcel Mauss The Gift? The results provide support for the claim that the institution of reciprocity is a socially stabilizing exchange mechanism. Suppose that the first interactions among different prehistoric tribes or bands were characterized, in the words of Hobbes, as being 'short, nasty, and brutish/1 In the absence of voluntary exchange institutions, such as reciprocity, through which these groups could interact in more cooperative ways, their initial external interactions may have been characterized by plunder, pillage and war. It is from these conflictive relations that more cooperative institutions may have been chosen or have evolved. This paper shows how the gift could have allowed for the evolution of more cooperative relations through credible threats of returning to conflict if the gift was not returned. The original motivation for the return of the gift may have been to elicit cooperation.

I will first describe a simple game that models the Hobbesian state of nature. Conditions supporting an equilibrium of mutual predation are discussed. Second, through the derivation of a trigger strategy equilibrium, an escape from this world of mutual predation becomes possible. It is shown that cooperation is more easily susta

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A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Marce丨 Mauss The Gift

ROBERT RIDER*

California State University, San Marcos

This article proposes that a game theoretic interpretation can be made of Marcel Mauss The Gift. The results provide support for the claim that the institution of reciprocity is a socially stabilizing exchange mechanism. Suppose that the first interactions among different prehistoric tribes or bands were characterized, in the words of Hobbes, as being “short, nasty, and brutish.” In the absence of voluntary exchange institutions, such as reciprocity, through which these groups could interact in more cooperative ways, their initial exteraal interactions may have been characterized by plunder, pillage and war. It is from these conflictive relations that more cooperative institutions may have been chosen or have evolved. This paper shows how the gift, and reciprocity in general, could have allowed for the evolution of more cooperative relations through credible threats of returning to conflict if the gift was not returned. It is argued that the original motivation for the return of the gift may have been to elicit cooperation. Only after this cooperation had been attained could the gift then evolve into the social norm that Mauss had observed. It further suggests that reciprocity may have an origin of conflict.

INTRODUCTION

Economists have been increasingly focusing their research efforts on an analysis of power, and the interplay between conflict and cooperation, (Bartlett, 1989).¹ The interaction between conflict and cooperation has proven to be highly complex. They are not mutually exclusive. It is best to think of them in their purest forms as lying at opposite

*Direct all correspondence to: Robert Rider, Economics Program, California State University, San Marcos, California 92096-0001. Telephone: (760) 750-4140. E-mail: rrider@coyote.csusm.edu

The Social Science Journal, Volume 35, Number 2, pages 203-212.

Copyright copy; 1998 by JAI Press Inc.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0362-3319.

204

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL Vol. 35/No. 2/1998

ends of a double continuum. Between these polar ends, though, there are complex mixtures of cooperation and conflict. Social institutions, such as property rights and exchange, can be interpreted as combinations of cooperation and conflict. Even institutions which appear to be of a purely voluntary nature may be supported by or have origins in conflict. By expanding our focus to be inclusive of conflict and power, we have gained important and surprising insights into a myriad of social phenomena.²

This research note proposes a game theoretic interpretation of Marcel Mauss^T The Gift? The results provide support for the claim that the institution of reciprocity is a socially stabilizing exchange mechanism. Suppose that the first interactions among different prehistoric tribes or bands were characterized, in the words of Hobbes, as being 'short, nasty, and brutish/¹ In the absence of voluntary exchange institutions, such as reciprocity, through which these groups could interact in more cooperative ways, their initial external interactions may have been characterized by plunder, pillage and war. It is from these conflictive relations that more cooperative institutions may have been chosen or have evolved. This paper shows how the gift could have allowed for the evolution of more cooperative relations through credible threats of returning to conflict if the gift was not returned. The original motivation for the return of the gift may have been to elicit cooperation.

I will first describe a simple game that models the Hobbesian state of nature. Conditions supporting an equilibrium of mutual predation are discussed. Second, through the derivation of a trigger strategy equilibrium, an escape from this world of mutual predation becomes possible. It is shown that cooperation is more easily sustained the greater are the production and defensive skills, and the smaller are the predation skills of both players. Finally, these results are used to develop a game theoretic interpretation of Mauss work and the general concept of reciprocity. In particular, the system of total prestations and the social obligations attached to this institution closely correspond to the trigger strategies which initiate and sustain cooperation.

THE GAME

Let there be two clans, or players, A and B. Each produces a particular good with its labor endowment. A produces Y, and B produces X. Each has a utility function defined over both goods. (Superscripts will denote the player.) Let U^A{X_tY), and U^B{X,Y) be the utility functions for A and B respectively. The standard assumptions will be made.⁴

If A uses all of its labor to produce Y_y then ⁴y^T is the total amount it can produce. Similarly for 5, “x” is the total amount of good X it can produce.

Since this is the Hobbesian state of nature, a world without law, a time when there is ^t4war of every man against every man/⁵ the activity of predation (stealing and pillaging) is also available to each of the players. But predation is costly. It requires labor, which will reduce the amount of production during any period of time. It may also entail a loss of life or injury as the other clan defends itself. Let 9 represent this cost for A; let e represent this cost for B.

Predation, though, does have its benefits. Each predator is able to steal some of the other player^s production. Let a represent the amount of good Z A is able to steal from let P represent the amount of good Ffi is able to steal from A.

A Game-theoretic Interpretatio

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